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Infectious disease outbreaks can exact a high human 
and economic cost through illness and death. But, as 
with severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in East 
Asia in 2003, or the plague outbreak in Surat, India, in 
1994, they can also create severe economic disruptions 
even when there is, ultimately, relatively little illness 
or death. Such disruptions are commonly the result of 
uncoordinated and panicky efforts by individuals to avoid 
becoming infected, of preventive activity. This paper 
places these “SARS type” effects in the context of research 
on economic epidemiology, in which behavioral responses 
to disease risk have both economic and epidemiological 
consequences. The paper looks in particular at how 
people form subjective probability judgments about 
disease risk. Public opinion surveys during the SARS 
outbreak provide suggestive evidence that people did 
This paper—a product of the Chief Economist's Office in the World Bank's East Asia and Pacific Region—is part of a 
larger effort in the Region to better understand the economic aspects of infectious diseases, with a view to developing more 
effective policies to alleviate their human and economic costs. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web 
at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at mbrahmbhatt@worldbank.org. 
indeed at times hold excessively high perceptions of the 
risk of becoming infected, or, if infected, of dying from 
the disease. The paper discusses research in behavioral 
economics and the theory of information cascades that 
may shed light on the origin of such biases. The authors 
consider whether public information strategies can help 
reduce unwarranted panic. A preliminary question is 
why governments often seem to have strong incentives to 
conceal information about infectious disease outbreaks. 
The paper reviews recent game-theoretic analysis that 
clarifies government incentives. An important finding 
is that government incentives to conceal decline the 
more numerous are non-official sources of information 
about a possible disease outbreak. The findings suggest 
that honesty may indeed be the best public policy under 
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1.  Introduction 
Recent years have seen a renewed interest in the surveillance and control of 
infectious diseases, as well as in their importance as a problem in economic development.  
The revival of attention follows the emergence of many new infectious diseases  - more 
than 30 in the past 25 years – including HIV-AIDS and, more recently, severe acute 
respiratory syndrome (SARS), the emergence of drug resistant strains of old diseases, and 
the return of concern about old threats that had never gone away, such as pandemic 
human influenza.  Interest in the economics of infectious diseases has also increased with 
recent experience of the large economic costs they can entail, for example those arising 
from the enormous illness and mortality associated with HIV-AIDS in developing 
countries, or the short-lived but severe economic shocks that occurred as a result of 
SARS in 2003 or the plague outbreak in Surat, India, in 1994, disease outbreaks that, 
unlike HIV-AIDS, in the end caused relatively little illness and death.   
Infectious disease events of the type exemplified by Surat and SARS are 
interesting because they do not fit too well within the standard “cost of illness” approach 
to measuring the economic impacts of disease.  In this paper we stand back to look at 
recent work in economics that helps place the type of effects at work in such episodes 
into a broader conceptual and analytical framework that also encompasses the cost of 
illness approach.  Such a framework should be helpful in deepening our understanding of 
the links between infectious diseases, individual choices and behavior, public health 
policies, and the economy.  Ideally it should also help improve understanding of the 
constraints and tradeoffs facing public health policy makers, as well provide some insight 
into ways to improve public health policies. 
Section 2 of the paper outlines the standard cost of illness approach, which 
focuses on the opportunity cost of resources that are consumed or lost as a result of 
disease, whether these are direct costs, such as the costs of medical treatment, or indirect 
costs, such as loss of productive capacity due to illness and death.  This approach is the 
backbone of many recent studies of the economic costs of HIV-AIDS, for example.   
Section 2 then briefly reviews the Surat and SARS events as exemplifying aspects of 
infectious disease outbreaks for which the standard approach seems inadequate.  The 
economic essence of these events appears to reside in costs of prevention, in one form or 
another. Thus the main economic effects arise from the uncoordinated and sometimes 
panicky efforts of millions of private individuals to avoid becoming infected, for example 
by fleeing from the area of an outbreak or by reducing their contacts with other people. 
Such effects are sometimes aggravated by the information and risk communications 
strategies pursued by governments in affected countries, as well as by the often excessive 
trade and travel restrictions imposed by governments in other countries, which are 
justified as a way of preventing the international spread of the disease. 
Section 3 suggests that recent work in economic epidemiology may provide a 
natural framework for analyzing infectious disease events like SARS, Surat or a potential 
human influenza pandemic.  The key intuition of this approach is that self-interested, 
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disease and the threat it poses to them.  These changes in behavior will differ according 
to the disease, but they will generally have both economic and epidemiological 
consequences, in the latter case by feeding back into the rate of new infections and 
disease prevalence.  We set out a simplified version of a standard S-I-R epidemiological 
model to illustrate how such models can be adapted to reflect choice of preventive 
behaviors by utility-maximizing individuals. Section 3 then focuses on the primordial 
facts of high uncertainty and highly imperfect information that typically prevail during 
infectious disease outbreaks.  One implication of these facts is that the nature of 
protective changes in behavior will depend critically on people’s subjective judgments of 
probability about their uncertain environment, for example on the probability that an 
outbreak has occurred, or on the conditional probability that they will become infected 
given a certain level of protective action.   
How do people form these subjective probabilities? A useful benchmark 
assumption is that of rational expectations, that people do not make persistent and 
systematic errors about the key probabilities governing their environment.   On the other 
hand research in psychology and behavioral economics over recent decades amply 
demonstrates the presence of substantial biases in probability judgments in many contexts. 
Recent theoretical work on information cascades and herding behavior also suggests the 
possibility that in situations of imperfect information people may rationally look at the 
behavior of others as a source of information, and that this procedure can lead large 
numbers to jump to the same erroneous conclusions and sub-optimal decisions.  It seems 
quite likely that under the conditions of high uncertainty, poor information, rapid change 
and emotional stress that prevail during an infectious disease outbreak, individuals could 
well arrive at significantly biased subjective assessments on key factual issues, at least for 
a time, leading them to panic and take less than optimal decisions, resulting, in the 
aggregate, in an excessively high cost of private preventive actions.  Section 3 looks at 
public opinion surveys taken during SARS which provide suggestive (though not 
conclusive) evidence that people did indeed at times hold excessively high perceptions of 
the risk of becoming infected with SARS, or, if infected, of dying from the disease.  
However some survey evidence from SARS also suggests that disease risk perceptions 
are quite sensitive to new information, and that people are constantly trying to update and 
improve their subjective probability assessments.  This makes sense, since being 
consistently wrong can be expensive in an infectious disease setting. 
Section 4 looks more closely at the role of information and communications in 
public health policy. The likelihood that people can and do make economically costly 
mistakes about how best to protect themselves from infectious disease suggests a 
rationale for public information and risk communication strategies that help reduce 
unwarranted panic by providing the public with more accurate and timely information.  
The need for transparency in public risk communications strategy is widely promoted 
nowadays.  Why then is it that not infrequently a government’s initial impulse is to try 
and conceal information about an outbreak from the public and from international bodies 
like the WHO?  To achieve more transparent information strategies it is first necessary to 
understand the incentives facing governments.  In the early stages of a limited disease 
outbreak there may be considerable uncertainty about whether it will turn into an 
epidemic or simply fizzle out, so that there is an incentive for the government to simply 
  3“wait and see”, especially if an announcement by the government might itself start a 
panic or provoke the kinds of severe trade and travel restrictions that were imposed on 
India during the 1994 Surat plague outbreak.  Against these possible benefits must be set 
the increased risk of the outbreak turning into a full blown epidemic because of secrecy 
and delays in launching public health measures or in calling for international assistance.   
Recent work that employs a game-theoretic framework to analyze the 
government’s choices helps clarify the conditions under which the government reports or 
hides information about a disease outbreak.  An important finding is that the incentives to 
hide information decline when there is an increase in non-official sources of information 
about the outbreak, for example via cell phones or the internet, and a consequent increase 
in the probability that the country will be subjected to pre-emptive sanctions by other 
governments (or by its own public) despite its efforts at concealment.  Indeed efforts to 
hide information may only undermine the government’s credibility with its own public 
and with international partners, fostering even greater uncertainty, panic and foreign 
sanctions.  Even putting aside ethical considerations and using only a narrow cost-benefit 
calculus, it seems that the modern environment of easy mass communications within and 
between countries increasingly makes honesty the best policy in public risk 
communications.  A transparent and credible public information strategy is likely to be 
the best way to minimize unwarranted panic and, indeed, to mobilize the public as a 
partner in controlling the disease outbreak.  We briefly look at the information strategy 
adopted by Singapore as an example.  Section 5 of the paper provides concluding 
remarks. 
 
2.  Economic Costs of Disease – Questions from SARS and Surat 
 
In recent years a number of epidemic disease outbreaks have generated severe 
economic effects that do not easily fit into the standard approach to measuring the 
economic costs of disease.  The outbreak of plague in 1994 in Surat, India and the 2003 
SARS outbreak in East Asia are examples.  To highlight the distinctiveness of these 
episodes this section first outlines the standard “cost of illness” approach to measuring 
the economic impact of disease.  It then briefly reviews the Surat and SARS events, 
pointing to aspects for which the standard approach seems inadequate.   
The Cost of Illness approach  
The cost of illness approach focuses on the opportunity cost of resources that are 
consumed or lost as a result of disease.  These costs are of two types.  Direct costs are 
resources used to treat or cope with the disease, for example expenditures for medical 
care and treatment, such as the costs of hospital care, physician services, nursing, drugs 
and so on.  Indirect costs comprise the present and future costs to society from morbidity, 
disability and premature mortality, in particular losses of output caused by reduced 
productivity or death of workers.
2   
                                                 
2 US EPA (1991-ongoing) and RTA International (2006) discuss the cost of illness methodology and 
provide empirical cost estimates for various diseases.  A different though related method is the Burden of 
Disease approach, which uses the Disability Adjusted Life Year (DALY) measure.  DALYs measure the 
  4Examples of economic analyses based on this approach include Meltzer, Cox and 
Fukuda (1999), which develops monetary estimates of the direct and indirect costs of an 
influenza epidemic in the United States.   The cost of illness approach also provides the 
basic conceptual framework in many studies analyzing the economy-wide costs of HIV-
AIDS.  Recent work in this area includes sophisticated analyses of the inter-temporal 
general equilibrium effects associated with the direct and indirect (illness and death) costs 
of  HIV-AIDS:  for example, reduced private and public saving and investment due to 
resources being diverted to medical treatment for the sick; reductions in the size of the 
effective labor force due to illness and death, as well as declines in productivity of the 
remaining labor force, with differential impacts across sectors; falling human capital due 
to reduced transmission of knowledge and capacity from missing parents to orphaned 
children.
3   
Episodes like the plague outbreak in Surat and SARS are particularly interesting 
because they do not fit the standard model but still involved large economic effects.  
These effects did not arise principally from direct medical costs or from actual sickness 
or death, which, thankfully, were very limited.  Official estimates counted only 52 
suspected plague related deaths in Surat.  The WHO’s final tally for SARS is 8,096 
probable cases worldwide, resulting in 774 deaths.  The major economic effects in these 
events arise instead from the uncoordinated efforts of millions of private individuals to 
avoid becoming infected. Costs of prevention are at the forefront here. Such effects are 
sometimes aggravated by erroneous public risk communications strategies and by the 
trade and travel restrictions imposed by governments in other countries, actions that are 
often excessive but which are rationalized by the need to prevent the international spread 
of the disease.  
The 1994 Plague Outbreak in Surat 
The first recorded sign of a plague outbreak in the western Indian city of Surat 
occurred on September 19, 1994 when a patient was rushed to the New Civil Hospital 
with high fever, soon followed by two more, all being given routine malaria treatment. 
By September 20 the hospital had admitted seven patients with ‘pneumonia-like’ 
symptoms. Other hospitals reported patients with similar symptoms. By September 21 
seven patients had died citywide. A lack of adequate diagnostic testing facilities led 
public hospital doctors, conferring with private sector colleagues, to rely on sensitive 
clinical diagnoses, without waiting for laboratory results, and to conclude that there had 
been an outbreak of plague (Cash and Narasimhan 2000).   
At this point there occurred what the Center for Science and Environment in India 
describes as a “crisis of confidence among the public authorities”, which “was one of the 
most striking features of the Surat epidemic” and which, in combination with the “lack of 
trust of the people in the government”, contributed greatly to the panic that swept the city  
(CSE India 2006).  An initial attitude of skepticism or denial evolved into confusion as 
                                                                                                                                                 
numbers of years of potential healthy life that are lost due to premature death, poor health or disability.  
(Lopez et al, 2006). 
3 See for example Drouhin, Touze and Ventelou (2003), Gaffeo (2003) and Bell, Devarajan and Gersbach 
(2004) and references to the extensive ‘Economics of AIDS’ literature therein.    
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number of infections and deaths and whether and when quarantine would be imposed. 
City administration tottered as half the civil work force reported sick.  Members of the 
public were thrown back on word of mouth, rumor and exaggerated media reports in 
making their own assessment about the likelihood of a plague outbreak and of the danger 
of infection to themselves and their families.   Given the lack of accurate information 
about actual overall infection and fatality rates, the public’s perceptions of risk appear to 
have become anchored on the most vivid and frightening aspect of rumors and media 
reporting, the high mortality among reported hospital cases.  “From September 19-22, 
1994, there were three straight days of chaos at the Surat railway station and the bus 
stand. People clambered on any and every vehicle that could take them away… More 
than half of the physicians departed as well.”  (Tysmans 1995). By September 26 it is 
estimated that up to a quarter of the city’s 2.2 million people had fled the city.  Panic 
spread to other major cities. (Ramalingaswami 2000).   
The economic repercussions of the Surat outbreak were immediate and severe.  
Businesses in Surat city lost an estimated $260 million in trade due to the negative 
demand shock caused by the panic.  Many countries in Asia and the Eastern 
Mediterranean stopped flights to and from India.  The UAE suspended cargo 
transshipments from India, a major blow to Indian exporting capacity. Many countries 
embargoed imports of foodstuffs, textiles or other goods from India. The loss of exports 
was estimated to be at least US$420 million at 1994 prices.  All this occurred despite a 
request from the WHO that no trade or travel restrictions be imposed on India. In addition, 
tourist bookings fell by at least 2.2 million.  Overall economic losses associated with the 
outbreak were put at over $2 billion.    (Cash and Narasimhan  2000, Susarla 1996).  
The 2003 SARS Epidemic    
The first cases of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) are thought to have 
occurred in China’s Guangdong province in November 2002.  In his narrative of events 
Huang (2004) notes that local health personnel reported to superiors about the new 
disease in mid December 2002, but, given some restrictions on the release of public 
health-related information, it was not till February 2003 that Guangdong health officials 
made a public announcement about the disease.  The first nationwide alert was issued in 
early April and a coordinated and effective campaign to combat SARS in China began in 
mid April.   
Word of mouth about the disease spread quickly both inside and outside China, a 
process facilitated by widespread access to cell phones and the internet.   It is estimated 
that “billions” of cell phone text messages with some reference to the disease were sent in 
the country.  According to Pomfret (2003a), from February 8 to 10 the SMS text message 
“There is a fatal flu in Guangzhou” was sent 126 million times in Guangzhou city alone.  
Pharmacies were stripped of antibiotics and flu medications. Meanwhile, according to the 
WHO, the first probable case in Hong Kong occurred on February 15, with an escalation 
from late February.  Infected travelers from Hong Kong subsequently started outbreaks in 
Vietnam, Singapore and Canada, touching off a world wide career that ultimately 
affected some 32 countries and territories.    
  6Within China, the first recorded case in Beijing occurred on March 5. The 
numbers of probable cases in Beijing began accelerating at the beginning of April, 
peaking at over 100 per day in the latter part of the month.  (Liang et al 2004).   The 
Beijing local government sharply revised up the SARS caseload in the city from 37 to 
339 on April 19. (Beech 2003).  In another week, even this number tripled. On April 23 
reports from the scene described thousands of people at Beijing West rail terminal 
attempting to flee the city. By April 26 journalists were estimating that a million people 
(a little under 10 percent of Beijing’s population) had left the city. (Pomfret 2003b).  
Highlighting the gravity of these developments, Huang (2004) argues that “The SARS 
epidemic was not simply a public health problem….it caused the most severe socio-
political crisis” in many years. 
The most significant economic impacts from SARS occurred in the four East 
Asian economies with the highest number of probable cases: China, Hong Kong, Taiwan 
(China) and Singapore. The major source of the economic impacts experienced in these 
economies were the large, though short-lived, negative demand shocks induced by the 
efforts of individuals to avoid becoming infected, leading to steep reductions in foreign 
and domestic tourism, as well as reduced domestic traffic for services sectors such as 
retail stores, hotels, restaurants and transportation.  Lee and Mckibbin (2003) also point 
to the possibility of increases in business costs due to supply side disruptions and of 
increases in economies’ risk premiums in international capital markets. However it was 
the negative demand effects that predominated in practice.   
Hai et al (2004) report on a survey of businesses in Beijing carried out on April 18.  
Tourist attractions, exhibitions and 4/5 star hotels reported a loss of revenue compared to 
a year earlier of around 80 percent, while travel agencies, airlines, railways, restaurants, 
retailers and taxis reported declines in revenue of 10-50 percent.  Hanna and Huang 
(2004) estimate that China’s GDP contracted by over 5 percent in the second quarter of 
2003 on a seasonally adjusted annualized basis, or a loss of around 0.5 percent of GDP 
for 2003 as a whole.  Siu and Wong (2004) document similar demand side impacts on 
tourism and other services sectors in Hong Kong, leading to a fall in GDP in the second 
quarter of 2003 of 10.5 percent from the previous quarter, at a seasonally adjusted 
annualized rate. Leading the decline were a 43 percent drop in services exports 
(principally tourism) and a 7.9 percent drop in personal consumption by residents (both at 
quarter on quarter, seasonally adjusted annual rates).  Exhibit 1 illustrates the pattern of a 
sharp GDP decline in the second quarter followed by a robust rebound in the third for not 
only Hong Kong but also Singapore and Taiwan (China). Calculating the counterfactual 
of how the economy would have grown without SARS is an uncertain and complicated 
matter.  We note that Hong Kong real GDP was growing at a year on year pace of around 
4.5 percent in the two quarters before SARS and in the two quarters after it.  Making the 
simple minded assumption that the economy would have grown at 4.5 percent throughout 
the year without SARS leads to an estimated 1.1 percent loss in GDP for 2003 as a whole 
as a result of SARS.  Using a more sophisticated econometric approach, Fan (2003) 
estimated a similar sized GDP loss for Singapore.  Chou et al (2004) use a computable 
general equilibrium model to estimate a 0.6-0.7 percent GDP loss for Taiwan (China).   
  7There is of course no one right 
answer about the size of the economic 
losses exacted by SARS.  Much will 
depend on the underlying economic 
model that is applied, and the 
assumptions made about the conditions 
and policies that would have prevailed 
in a counterfactual scenario.  The point 
here is merely to stress that a number of 
different analytical approaches all point 
to economic losses in the main SARS 
affected economies that are much larger 
than any that would have been 
suggested by the standard cost of illness 
approach: the estimated GDP losses in 
2003 for the four economies discussed 
amount to on the order of $13 billion, 
despite there being only somewhat over 
7000 possible cases and a little over 700 
fatalities in the 4 economies combined.   
Exhibit 1 
 
Real GDP in 3 SARS Affected Economies








The fact that the standard costs of illness were relatively unimportant in the SARS 
and Surat events should not be read to suggest that they are unimportant in general.  
Illness and death of course remain much the most important facts about infectious 
diseases.  That, after all, is why people take protective action against such diseases in the 
first place. A potential human influenza pandemic is an example where both types of 
effects or costs would likely be important.  This is a case where there could be both 
severe initial demand shocks arising from protective actions taken by individuals, as well 
as substantial costs of illness arising from morbidity and death on a large scale.  Recent 
efforts to model the economic impacts of an influenza pandemic (for example Mckibbin 
and Sidorenko 2006, World Bank 2006a) therefore address both these sets of issues.   
 
3.  The Economic Epidemiology Approach – and Possible Embellishments 
 
Work in economic epidemiology over the last decade or so may provide a useful 
theoretical model for analyzing events such as the Surat or SARS outbreaks, or a 
potential influenza pandemic.
4  Such a framework aims in principle to bring out the links 
between the epidemiology and dynamics of a disease, the purposive behavioral responses 
of people in reaction to the disease and the economic consequences that follow from 
these behavioral responses as well as from illness and death (the latter being the ground 
covered by the cost of illness model).   
 
                                                 
4 For example Geoffard and Philipson (1996), Kremer (1996), Philipson (2000), and Gersovitz and 
Hammer (2001, 2003). 
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A key intuition in the economic epidemiology approach is that self-interested, 
forward looking individuals will adapt their behavior to take account of the prevalence of 
a disease and the threat it poses to them. They will typically change their behavior to 
better protect themselves as the prevalence of the disease increases, while also taking into 
account the costs of such protective actions.  Geoffard and Philipson (1996) label this 
prevalence-elastic behavior.  The prevalence of the disease will in turn also be affected 
by the changed behavior of individuals.  Disease prevalence and protective action by 
individuals then both emerge as endogenous outcomes in a constrained dynamic 
optimization problem, the constraints being provided by the biology of the disease in 
question, the range and cost of protective actions that may be available for that disease 
and, importantly, the information available to individuals in making decisions.   
  Philipson (2000) and Gersovitz and Hammer (2001) model prevalence-elastic 
behavior in the context of a standard S-I-R epidemiological model (see for example, 
Anderson and May, 1991).  We outline a highly simplified version to help fix ideas.  
Here the population N is comprised of the number who are susceptible to disease (S), 
infected and infectious (I) and recovered and immune (R).   
(1)  N = S + I + R  
  The proportions of these groups in the population are denoted in lower case letters, 
so that s + i + r = 1.  The number of susceptibles in a given time period declines by the 
number who become newly infected, as shown in equation (2).  The expression for new 
infections α S i  assumes a homogenous population in which people have contact with 
each other at random and with equal probability.   The probability that a susceptible 
person’s next contact will be with an infected person is given by the aggregate infection 
(or prevalence) rate i.  The expression S.i then gives the total number of susceptible 
people who meet an infected person, assuming every susceptible person has one contact.  
The adjustment factor α reflects both the inherent infectiousness of an infected person 
and the number of contacts per person per period. 
(2)  dS/dt =  - α S i . 
  In equation (3) the change in the number of infected people equals the number of 
new infections less the number of infected people who recover and become immune, 
given by δ I, where δ is the rate at which an infected person recovers and R is the stock of 
recovered people.  
(3)  dI/dt  =   α S i – δ I . 
(4)  dR/dt =   δ I. 
(5)       h =   α S i/S=  α i. 
  In a purely epidemiological model the infection adjustment factor α and the 
recovery factor δ are some fixed parameters.  In such a model the hazard rate h – the 
proportion of susceptible people who become newly infected in each period (Equation 5) 
– always increases as the prevalence rate i goes up.   
  9In a choice-based model, on the other hand, α and δ become choice variables 
which the individual selects so as to maximize some utility function, subject to the 
constraints in equations (2)-(4).  The recovery factor δ may be adjusted, for example, by 
choosing to spend more on medical care, while the infection adjustment factor α could be 
adjusted by reducing the number of contacts the individual has with other people.  In such 
a model, the hazard rate may or may not rise, depending on whether and how much 
people push down the adjustment factor α in response to a rise in the prevalence rate i.   
  The protective choices open to individuals will differ according to the nature of 
the disease and other circumstances.  Where a vaccine is available, the choice may be 
whether to take the vaccine or not.  In the context of sexually transmitted diseases, the 
relevant choice variable becomes the number and type of sexual partners chosen 
(“assortative matching”), as well as condom use and other sexual practices. (Velasco-
Hernandez and Hsieh 1994).   Philipson (2000) summarizes evidence for significant 
prevalence-elasticity in the demand for condoms and choice of partners in relation to 
HIV-AIDS prevalence in the USA (as well as in the demand for vaccines in relation to 
prevalence of seasonal influenza, measles, mumps, rubella and MMR). Kremer (1996) 
explores a model where increased HIV-AIDS prevalence leads people with a low level of 
sexual activity to reduce their number of partners, but where people with high sexual 
activity may increase their number of partners (because of the high likelihood that one of 
their existing partners will already have infected them, a form of “rational fatalism”). 
Oster (2006) explores reasons for the apparent low prevalence elasticity of HIV-AIDS 
response in Africa.
5  Del Valle et al (2005) study the potential impact of behavioral 
change in a mathematic model of a smallpox outbreak.  While most studies in this area 
have focused on infectious diseases where transmission is from person to person, Raut 
(2004) studies behavioral change in response to a vector-borne infectious disease, malaria.   
The economic epidemiology approach should provide a natural framework for 
analyzing events like the Surat plague, SARS or a potential influenza pandemic in several 
ways.   First, the essence of these events is a rapid and highly prevalence elastic response 
in the behavior of the public in response to the threat of a disease outbreak.  People try to 
form a view of the likely characteristics of the disease, and then take actions to reduce the 
threat of becoming infected, for example by fleeing the area or by trying to reduce the 
number of contacts with other people in the area of the outbreak.  An important priority 
for future research is to better understand the types and intensity of these prevalence 
elastic responses.  In particular, how do such responses vary according to the 
transmission mechanism and virulence of the disease, the availability of information, the 
quality of the health system, the general level of economic development, and so on? 
Second, the economic epidemiology approach draws attention to the costs of 
preventive actions, which in the case of Surat and SARS turned out to be the predominant 
                                                 
5 Oster (2006) looks at a problem for both traditional epidemiological and economic epidemiology models 
– the unexpectedly large scale of the HIV-AIDS epidemic in Africa and the apparent lack of prevalence 
elasticity there (compared to high elasticities of behavior change in developed countries, for example 
among gay men).  Oster provides some evidence that low prevalence elasticity in Africa may be linked to 
low pre-existing life expectancy and low income levels.  In other words, a person expecting to lead a short, 
impoverished life will be less inclined to change behavior in response to the threat of AIDS than a person 
expecting a long and wealthy one.   
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significantly prevalence-elastic, the main welfare cost of a disease is likely to consist of 
the distorted behavior that the disease induces.  For example, because there are no new 
polio infections in a developed economy like the United States does not mean that there 
is a zero cost of illness from this source.  In fact polio exacts a significant ongoing cost in 
the form of the annual preventive vaccination effort that it induces.   
Lastly, the economic epidemiology approach also points to the impact of private 
preventive behavior in driving disease dynamics.  People’s preventive behavior not only 
has costs but may also have potentially large benefits by breaking the transmission of the 
disease. Simulations by Del Valle et al (2005) suggest that even mild private behavioral 
changes could have a major impact in suppressing a smallpox outbreak.  We do not know 
what impact the spontaneous efforts of people to reduce their daily contacts had in the 
surprisingly rapid disappearance of SARS.  What role did private preventive behavior 
play in past human influenza pandemics and how might it affect the course of a future 
pandemic? These too are important areas for further research.    
Uncertainty and Imperfect Information Considerations 
However, while many features of the Surat and SARS episodes fit nicely within 
the general economic epidemiology framework, they also have some distinctive aspects 
related, in particular, to the high levels of uncertainty and very imperfect information 
available to individuals.  Economic epidemiology analyses often assume that individuals 
decide on the optimal level of preventive action without making systematic errors about 
the objective situation they face, for example about whether an epidemic outbreak has 
occurred, about the transmission mechanism and infectiousness of the disease, the 
morbidity and mortality associated with infection and the overall disease prevalence rate 
in the population.  In more technical terms individuals are assumed to have rational 
expectations: they do not have systematically biased subjective prior probabilities about 
the likelihood of relevant events.  This is not in fact an unreasonable working assumption 
for infectious disease situations, when the costs of “getting it wrong” could be high – for 
example illness or death, on the one hand, or, on the other, the economic disruption and 
stress from excessive or unwarranted preventive actions.  Individuals in disease situations 
should have strong incentives not to make systematic errors about the state of the world, 
or to try and quickly correct themselves when they do.
6 
There is nevertheless suggestive contrasting evidence from the Surat and SARS 
events (see next section) that, under the prevailing conditions of poor information and 
stress, individuals may still arrive at significantly biased or systematically erroneous 
subjective assessments on critical factual issues, at least for a time, leading them to panic 
and take less than optimal decisions, resulting, in the aggregate, in an excessively high 
cost of private preventive action.  The possibility of such biases is well documented by 
                                                 
6 Caplan (2000) presents a model of “rational irrationality”, where individuals may get some net utility 
from holding systematically erroneous beliefs, particularly when such beliefs are not too costly for one’s 
own health and wealth, for example from believing that the theory of evolution is wrong or that one’s 
nation is “the best in the world” (although such mistaken beliefs could turn out to be quite costly in the 
aggregate).  However the demand for irrational personal beliefs should fall as the cost to one’s self of being 
wrong increases. 
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information cascades and herding behavior may also be relevant.   These considerations 
suggest interesting directions in which to elaborate or embellish economic epidemiology 
models. At a practical policy level they lead to a strong focus on the importance of public 
information and risk communication strategies and on the problem of inducing agents 
(including governments) to reveal private information they may hold about the disease 
situation. 
Before taking up these topics in more detail it may be useful to clarify a little 
further the decision problem facing an individual during an epidemic disease outbreak, 
highlighting the critical role played by the individual’s subjective probabilities.  Exhibit 2 
shows a highly simplified decision tree for a (risk-neutral) individual who has to decide 
whether to take some protective action (for example whether to flee the city).  To make 
this decision the individual needs to form a subjective probability about whether an 
epidemic outbreak has occurred.  Say she thinks an outbreak has occurred with a 0.25 
probability.  Then she must assess the probability that she will get infected, which is a 
conditional probability: its value will depend on whether an outbreak has indeed occurred, 
on whether the individual has taken protective action and on other conditions (contained 
in the vector X), for example the quality of public health and medical services in the city, 























-$1000     P(Outbreak)*P(Infection│Outbreak, Protect, X) 
= 0.25*0.05 = 0.0125
-$100       P(Outbreak)*P(No Infection│Outbreak, Protect, X) 
= 0.25*0.95 = 0.2375
-$1000     P(No Outbreak)*P(Infection│No Outbreak, Protect, X) 
= 0.75*0.01 = 0.0075
-$100       P(No Outbreak)*P(No Infection│No Outbreak, Protect,X) 
= 0.75*0.99 = 0.7425
-$900       P(Outbreak)*P(Infection│Outbreak, Don’t Prot., X) 
= 0.25*0.60 = 0.15
$0            P(Outbreak)*P(No Infection│Outbreak, Don’t Prot, X) 
= 0.25*0.40 = 0.10
-$900       P(No Outbreak)*P(Infection│No Outbreak, Don’t Prot, X) 
= 0.75*0.01 = 0.0075
$0        P(No Outbreak)*P(No Infection│No Outbreak, Don’t Prot ,X) 











Exhibit 2:  Individual Decision 
Tree in a Threatened Outbreak  Loss       Subjective Probabilities 
 
Let’s say that in the event that an outbreak occurs when she has already taken 
protective action, the individual feels the probability of getting infected is a relatively low 
0.05.  If she were then to get infected, even after taking precautions, the cost of illness 
(plus the cost of the preventive action) would be, say, -$1000 in monetary terms.  The 
expected value of the loss on this branch of her decision tree is then 0.25*0.05*-$1000 = 
  12-$12.5.  Adding up the values for the relevant branches (using the assumed probabilities 
shown in Exhibit 2), the expected loss from taking protective action is:    
(-$1000*0.0125)+(-100*0.2375)+(-1000*0.0075)+(-100*0.7425) = -$118, 
while the expected loss from inaction is: 
(-$900*0.15)+($0*0.10)+(-$900*0.0075)+($0*0.7425) = -$141.75,  
leading to a decision to take protective action.  Obviously, this decision is quite sensitive 
to the subjective probabilities formed by the individual. If, for example, she assesses the 
probability of an outbreak as 0.2 or less, her decision switches to inaction.   How people 
form subjective expectations under conditions of imperfect information and high stress 
then becomes crucial.  
Insights from Behavioral Economics and Survey Evidence 
High uncertainty and pervasive lack of credible information is a common feature 
in the early stages of many infectious disease outbreaks, especially in developing 
countries.  People are thrown back on seeking information from rumors, word of mouth 
or sensationalized media reporting, as was seen in Surat or in Guangdong during SARS.  
Under these circumstances it would not be surprising to learn of substantial biases in 
people’s subjective estimates of key probabilities, at least for a time.  Research in 
behavioral economics over recent decades amply demonstrates the presence of such 
biases in probability judgments in many contexts.
7   Tversky and Kahneman (1974) note 
that, rather than undertake explicit probability calculations of the type illustrated in 
Exhibit 2, people generally form subjective probability judgments using “a limited 
number of heuristic principles which reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities 
and predicting values to simpler judgmental operations.”  These heuristics are generally 
quite useful but “sometimes they lead to severe and systematic errors.”  The availability 
heuristic, for example, describes the tendency of people to assess the probability of an 
event according to the ease with which instances of the event can be brought to mind.  
There is then a tendency to seriously overweight events that are memorable, vivid in 
imagination or a source of fear or dread.  People’s estimates of the probability of having 
an automobile accident shoots up temporarily after they see an overturned car by the 
roadside.  Similarly, people tend to greatly overestimate the risk posed by an uncommon 
but dreaded event like a nuclear accident (compared to the estimates of experts or the 
actual frequencies of such events), while they underestimate the risks from more common 
sources such as x-rays.  (Slovic and Weber, 2002).   
Another source of error is the representativeness heuristic:  people tend to form 
conditional probability judgments about the likelihood of a hypothesis (given some 
evidence) by how well the evidence resembles the hypothesis.   They tend, however, to 
ignore the prior or base rate probability of the hypothesis in question, or the likelihood of 
the evidence arising for reasons other than the hypothesis (thus breaching the 
requirements of Bayes Rule for calculating conditional probabilities).   People may then 
vastly overestimate the probability that a disease outbreak has occurred (H, the 
                                                 
7 See for example Tversky and Kahneman (1974), Rabin (1998), Mullainathan and Thaler (2000) and 
Camerer, Loewenstein and Rabin (2004) for surveys of this evidence. Frank (2004) looks at the 
contribution of behavioral economics to health economics. 
  13hypothesis) given a certain number 
of disease deaths (E, the evidence) by 
confusing it with the probability of 
such deaths occurring given a disease 
outbreak (in probability notation by 
confusing P(H│E) with P(E│H) ). 
Exhibit 3 
A number of surveys taken 
during the SARS outbreak provide 
direct evidence on people’s 
subjective probability assessments.   
Leung et al (2004) report that nearly 
a quarter of respondents in Hong 
Kong thought that they personally 
were either very or somewhat likely 
to become infected with SARS 
(Exhibit 3), even though the ex post 
infection or attack rate in Hong Kong 
(probable cases reported to WHO 
relative to population) was only 26 
per 100,000 population ( 0.0026 percent).  In the United States some 16 percent of 
respondents thought that the event that  they or their immediate family would get infected 
by SARS in the next twelve months was very or somewhat likely, despite an ex post 
attack rate not sensibly different from zero.  (Blendon et al 2003).  
 
SARS Risk Perceptions: Risk of Infection Very or 


































s                           Probable Cases:
      1755                    238                        251                       27
                           Attack Rate (%):
       0.026                  0.006                   0.006                     0.0
                    Case Fatality Rate (%):
         17                      14                        17                           0
Source:  Leung et al (2004);  Blendon et al (2003); WHO.
Strictly speaking one cannot infer that these subjective probabilities were 
necessarily biased or too high by simply comparing them to ex post attack rates, because 
of the possibility that low ex post rates were themselves the endogenous result of 
preventive action taken by people, based on their subjective risk perceptions.  The correct 
comparison might instead be to the theoretical counterfactual of what the ex post 
infection rate for SARS would have been had people not taken preventive actions, which 
is not an easy thing to calculate.  The large gap between subjective risk perceptions and 
actual outcomes is suggestive nonetheless. 
Survey evidence from Taiwan (China) throws light on some other aspects of risk 
perception, in particular the perceived risk of fatality in the event of infection and 
individuals’ willingness to pay (WTP) to avoid infection.   (Liu et al 2003).  Exhibit 4 
shows that 76 percent of respondents rated the likelihood of fatality after contracting 
SARS as 4 or 5 on a 5 point scale, which seems high compared to an actual case fatality 
rate in Taiwan (China) of 11 percent.  This may provide clearer cut evidence of 
subjective overestimate of risk, since the actual case fatality rate after infection is 
unlikely to have been much affected by people’s actions or risk perceptions.  (The exhibit 
also shows that most respondents thought they had a high level of knowledge about the 
disease, as well a moderate level of control over the disease.) 
Liu et al (2003) also asked people about their willingness to pay for a theoretical 
vaccine that eliminated the chance of infection given realistic odds of infection and 
mortality (3 or 5 per 100,000 per month for infection risk and 5 or 10 percent risk of 
mortality after infection).  From these responses the study inferred a Value per Statistical 
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rate of substitution between income and 
mortality risk) in the range of $4-9 
million per life, considerably higher 
than previous estimates of the VSL in 
Taiwan (China), which were in the 
range of $0.5-1.5 million.   The authors 
suggest that the high estimates of VSL 
from SARS respondents may be 
attributable to the high degree of 
salience and concern about SARS, or to 
the possibility that respondents believed 
the risk they faced to be higher than the 
probabilities used in the survey (3 or 5 
per 100,000 per month). 
Exhibit 4 
Finally, is it the case that, while 
people may make significant mistakes 
in forming subjective probabilities 
about disease events, they will tend to 
learn and improve these estimates over time?  Rabin (1998) notes that while learning is a 
reasonable conjecture, it is not nearly as valid in many experimental situations as 
economists generally imagine.   The amount of experimenting with new strategies or 
learning will depend on the opportunity costs of these activities, so that people could well 
stick with views and choices that turn out sub-optimal in the long run. (Mullainathan and 
Thaler 2000).  However such persistence in error seems less likely in epidemic disease 
situations, when errors in judgment have significant short run costs.  Lau et al (2003) 
appears to be unique in providing 
survey data (for Hong Kong) on how 
perceptions of SARS risk changed over 
time.  Exhibit 5 maps the proportion of 
people who thought the chance of 
getting infected was high or very high 
against the number of SARS infections 
reported on the previous day between 
March and May 2003.  The proportion 
of people concerned about a high risk 
of infection increased rapidly from 
around 4 to 14 percent of the 
population in late March, before 
coming back down to near 4 percent by 
mid May.  These changes in 
perceptions were not random, tending 
to rise and fall in association with the 
number of new infections reported on 
the previous day.  There is also a 
suggestion in the data that the impact 
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  15of new cases on perceptions tended to weaken with the cumulative number of cases, so 
that learning was not only short term (based on the previous day) but also based on 
cumulative experience of the outbreak as a whole.  This evidence that perceptions in an 
infectious disease outbreak are sensitive to information suggests the possibility that 
government could help minimize unwarranted panic by providing the public with 
accurate and timely information about the true state of affairs. 
Information Cascades and Herd Behavior?   
Research on information cascades and herding behavior may also provide a useful 
framework for analyzing individual behavior during threatened infectious disease 
outbreaks.
8  The basic idea is that in situations of imperfect information individuals may 
rationally look at the actions of other individuals as a source of information about the 
state of the world.  However this can sometimes lead to situations where most individuals 
jump to erroneous conclusions and socially sub-optimal decisions, for example to flee 
from the city even when the direct evidence available to them suggests otherwise.   
A highly simplified version of such a story might be as follows.  Individuals each 
receive different incomplete bits of private information (signals) about the state of the 
world, for example whether there has been an infectious disease outbreak in the city or 
not.  These (risk neutral) individuals can also observe the actions taken by others, 
although not others’ private signals.  They decide between one of two actions, say to flee 
from the city or stay put,  based on their private information and whatever they are able to 
surmise from the actions of others.  Suppose individual A receives a signal that there has 
been a disease outbreak and flees.  Individual B receives a signal that there is no outbreak, 
but observes that A has fled, presumably on the basis of a signal that there is an outbreak.  
Individual B does not know what to think and decides what to do by flipping a coin – 
which, as chance would have it, tells him to also flee.  Individual C also receives a signal 
that there is no outbreak, but, observing that both A and B have fled, rationally decides 
that it is better to ignore his own signal and also flee.  Thereafter there is an information 
cascade, with all subsequent individuals choosing to flee even if they all receive private 
signals that there is no outbreak. 
Do information cascades provide a good model for panic behavior during 
infectious disease outbreaks (or, as has been claimed, for phenomena like financial panics, 
fads and manias)?  Clearly, the model does generate predictions of the kind of sudden 
mass flight behavior experienced in some disease outbreaks.  More interestingly, the 
theory also predicts the fragility of herding behavior with respect to small shocks, 
stressing the random element in the emergence of cascades. A slightly different sequence 
of signals could either precipitate or preclude a cascade, which provides a simple 
explanation for the observed fact that herding behavior occurs in some disease outbreaks 
but not in others.  Since individuals in a cascade know that it is based on relatively little 
information, they are sensitive to the arrival of even small amounts of new information, 
for example through the arrival of better informed individuals or the release of new 
                                                 
8 For example Banerjee (1992), Gale (1996), Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1998), Avery and 
Zemsky (1998), Bikhchandani and Sharma (2001), Chari and Kehoe (2003). 
  16public information.  This would explain why cascades tend to be short lived and also 
points to the policy role of public communications strategy.   
Among the more significant criticisms of the model is its dependence on the 
assumption that people have only a discrete binary choice of actions (flee or stay put).  If, 
however, individuals have more choices or can act along a continuum (for example by 
varying the number of contacts per day with other people), then their actions can 
communicate more information and the chances of a cascade are reduced.  (Gale 1996).  
Information cascade models also do not admit of prices, which generally serve as 
powerful aggregators of information and whose presence could preclude information 
cascades.  (Avery and Zemsky 1998).  This criticism does not seem a major flaw in an 
infectious disease context, where there are generally no markets or prices reflecting 
information about the disease situation.
9    More recently Chari and Kehoe (2003) have 
argued that both these critiques of the information cascade/herding model (i.e. lack of 
continuous choices and lack of prices) can be rebutted when another assumption of the 
model is relaxed: the assumption that choices are made in some exogenously fixed 
sequence.  When individuals are allowed to choose the timing of their actions 
(“endogenous timing”) – a reasonable assumption in a disease context - then cascades 
and herding are found to occur even in models with continuous choices and prices.   
Overall it seems that information cascade models should provide a useful direction for 
further research into herding behavior during infectious disease outbreaks. 
 
4.  Information Strategies:  Some Policy Considerations 
 
In addition to the actions of private individuals, the assessments made by 
governments, their capabilities, actions and omissions also play a critical role in 
determining the economic and health impacts of infectious disease outbreaks.  The 
preceding discussion in particular suggests a strong rationale for public information and 
risk communication strategies that could help people update mistaken risk perceptions 
more quickly, or, in a herding context, break erroneous information cascades more 
promptly, thereby reducing the scope for over-costly disease prevention strategies.  We 
note two issues.  First, governments, especially in developing countries, are themselves 
sometimes woefully ill-informed about disease situations.  Strengthening weak disease 
surveillance systems is therefore an important priority in many countries.  Second, if 
there are such benefits from providing the public with accurate information, why is it that 
                                                 
9  It does however point to the possibility of creating artificial information aggregation or  prediction 
markets as a deliberate policy instrument to help pool the many bits of information about the existing and 
likely future disease situation that may be scattered among thousands of individuals in society.  An 
experimental Influenza Prediction Market is already functioning in the United States, with  health care 
professionals trading contracts on the level of seasonal influenza activity in several US states in the coming 
year, with the price of the contract equaling the probability that a given influenza outcome will occur.  An 
Avian Influenza Prediction Market also began trading in 2007. Experts in 40 countries trade contracts on, 
for example, whether the WHO will confirm a first human H5N1 case in North or South America by some 
given time, or whether the WHO will increase its phase of pandemic influenza alert by a given time. (On 
November 29, 2007 the contract on an increase in the WHO’s alert level occurring by July 1, 2008 was 
trading at 7 cents on the dollar, i.e. a 7 percent probability.)  Such prediction markets for political races are 
found to significantly outperform opinion polls.  They could provide an important tool to strengthen 
infectious disease surveillance.  (University of Iowa Health Prediction Markets 2007, Forsythe et al 1992).   
  17governments sometimes try to conceal information about a disease outbreak from the 
public and from international bodies like the WHO?  To achieve more transparent 
information strategies it is first necessary to understand the incentives for governments to 
conceal information about disease and to otherwise engage in strategic behavior that may 
result in less than optimal social outcomes at both national and global levels. 
Educating the Educators 
Especially in developing countries, governments themselves often function under 
conditions of highly imperfect information.  Poor surveillance capabilities mean that 
officials are often uncertain about the occurrence or nature of an infectious disease 
outbreak.  Cash and Narasimhan (2000) note that, in both the 1994 Surat plague outbreak 
and the 1991 cholera outbreak in Peru, lack of adequate testing facilities meant that the 
authorities were unable to collect reliable data quickly enough to provide an authoritative 
source of public information in the early days of the outbreak, allowing rumors and 
tendentious media reports to win the field.  In these cases lack of adequate diagnostic 
facilities also led to the use of excessively broad case definitions and inflated case 
numbers, which, in turn, contributed to panic among the public and excessive trade 
restrictions by trading partners.  
The problems of weak surveillance capacity can and should be addressed over 
time by devoting more effort to strengthening public health systems in this area, drawing 
not only on domestic resources but also on foreign financial and technical assistance.  
Concerns about avian influenza and a potential human influenza pandemic have indeed 
led to a significant increase in awareness about and development assistance aimed at 
strengthening animal and human health surveillance capacities in developing countries 
over the past 1-2 years.  (See for example UNSIC 2006, UNSIC/World Bank 2006, 
World Bank 2006b).  The revised International Health Regulations (IHR) adopted by the 
World Health Assembly in May 2005 also dramatically expand the scope of global public 
health surveillance, requiring governments to, among other things, promptly report “all 
events which may constitute a public health emergency of international concern” to the 
World Health Organization. (IHR 2005, Baker and Fidler 2006).  The development of 
health prediction markets could also provide a powerful forward looking complement to 
traditional surveillance methods (as discussed in footnote 9 above). 
Incentives in Public Risk Communications:  Is Honesty the Best Policy? 
Lack of public capability and resources are not the only source of poor 
information and lack of reporting about disease conditions. Under certain conditions 
governments can also have significant incentives to conceal or delay communicating 
information about disease conditions to the public, to other governments or to the World 
Health Organization.   There were examples of such delays during the SARS outbreak in 
2003.   
There are several factors that shape the incentive for governments to delay 
releasing information on disease conditions.  Especially in the early stages, there may be 
considerable uncertainty whether a disease outbreak will develop into a more serious 
epidemic.    Sometimes a rash of illness from a known or unknown source will raise 
  18concerns but then just peters out and is forgotten. Given that the outbreak might simply 
fizzle out of its own accord, there is an incentive for the authorities to “wait and see”.  
This incentive will be particularly strong when a premature announcement could lead to 
severe economic losses because of panic, excessive preventive actions by the public (for 
example flight from affected areas), declines in foreign tourism and severe and often 
unwarranted trade restrictions on the country’s exports imposed by other governments.   
Cash and Narasimhan (2000) observe that the trade and travel restrictions imposed on 
India in 1994 went far beyond the precautions for plague recommended in WHO 
regulations and occurred despite an explicit WHO request that such restrictions not be 
imposed on India.  Later, both the WHO and CDC concluded that the actions against 
India taken by other countries had been both excessive and unnecessary.
10  There could 
also be large political costs for a government that is seen to “cry wolf” and cause losses 
“unnecessarily”.   In 1976 an outbreak of swine flu in the US raised concerns about a 
potential human pandemic influenza.  Instead of downplaying or concealing the threat the 
authorities “did the right thing” and launched an aggressive public communication and 
preventive immunization program to counter it.  Unfortunately this effort turned into a 
political disaster for the administration when a pandemic failed to occur and, instead, the 
vaccination program itself led to medical complications, some deaths and a “litigation 
nightmare”.  (Kolata 1999).   
Alongside these putative benefits from delaying risk communications, there are 
also, of course, major potential costs.   An obvious one is the increase in epidemiological 
risk from delays in launching public health measures and in calling on international 
partners for technical and financial help to counter the outbreak.  This risk may be 
profound for new diseases such as SARS or a new pandemic influenza virus. In a 
potential human influenza pandemic, modeling suggests it may be possible to contain the 
pandemic strain at its point of origin using a rapid deployment of antiviral prophylaxis as 
well as social distancing measures, as long as the basic reproductive number, R0, is not 
above 1.8. (Ferguson et al 2005). However, success in such a strategy would depend on 
ready access to local and international stockpiles of relevant drugs, rapid case detection 
and delivery of treatment, and the cooperation of the population in the containment 
strategy, most of which presume extremely rapid sharing of information with 
international partners and a timely and credible public risk communication plan.    
Second, governments are sometimes over-confident about their ability to suppress 
or delay communication about a possible disease outbreak.  The growing availability of 
modern mass communications technologies like cell phones and internet access even in 
                                                 
10  Why do governments in non-outbreak countries appear to have such strong incentives to impose 
excessive trade and travel restrictions on potential outbreak countries?  One simple hypothesis is that they 
are merely responding to exaggerated perceptions of risk among their own publics (no doubt fuelled by 
lurid media accounts of the disease).  Governments may then see large political benefits and few costs from 
pandering to such fears by imposing unwarranted trade restrictions on the affected country.  The fact that 
the purely economic welfare cost of trade restrictions will generally exceed their benefit may not carry 
much weight in political economy terms:  economic costs will generally be spread over the mass of 
consumers and may amount to only a few cents per capita, so that there is unlikely to be any organized 
political opposition to the restrictions, while domestic producers who compete with the imported products 
are likely to be highly organized and vocal in their support for restrictions. This is clearly an area that 
would repay further study. 
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quickly spread within and outside the affected country through all sorts of unofficial 
channels – person to person communications, NGOs, businesses, media channels etc. - as 
occurred during SARS.  Among the key points that are likely to be communicated 
through these informal channels is precisely the observation that the government may be 
trying to suppress information about the outbreak.   This may then encourage a loss of 
trust in the government, even more reliance on rumor and speculation and even more 
excessive protective actions by the public than would have been the case if the 
government had “bitten the bullet” and reported transparently on whatever information it 
had in the first place.  The affected country may also lose reputation and credibility as a 
trustworthy international partner, thereby strengthening the rationale for other countries 
to use trade restrictions against it.  Recognizing the growing importance of  these 
unofficial sources, the IHR 2005 permit the WHO to collect and use information from 
multiple non-governmental sources in conducting its global surveillance, rather than, as 
previously, only from state sources. 
In a recent study Laxminarayan and Malani (2006) evaluate many of these costs 
and benefits in a game-theoretic analysis of the disease surveillance and reporting 
decisions that face governments in affected countries.  In this model governments first 
decide how much to invest in their disease surveillance systems, and then on whether to 
report the findings of the surveillance system as to whether there has been a disease 
outbreak.  Governments make these decisions on the basis of the probabilities they attach 
to several key events that help determine the payoffs to the game:   whether or not there 
will be a disease outbreak; whether the disease surveillance system will correctly signal 
the occurrence (or non-occurrence) of an outbreak; and whether the outbreak will escalate 
into a full-blown epidemic.  If a country decides to report an outbreak, it receives medical 
assistance from the WHO (which reduces the probability of an epidemic), but it also 
suffers ex post trade sanctions from the rest of the world.  Using backward induction to 
solve the government’s reporting problem leads to the conclusion that the government 
will be more likely to report an outbreak the smaller are ex post sanctions and the greater 
is the medical assistance from the WHO.  It is also more likely to report the greater is the 
chance of an outbreak escalating into an epidemic, the greater the number of lives lost in 
an epidemic and the more the government values those lives.  This suggests concealment 
may be more likely for a new disease whose virulence is initially not well known, like 
SARS, then for a better known and potentially very high mortality disease such as 
pandemic human influenza. 
What policy options might WHO deploy to induce greater disease reporting?   
Increased medical assistance would work in the right direction, but would of course be 
limited by the budget available to WHO.  Another theoretical possibility is giving WHO 
(or some other relevant international agency) the power to impose some form of punitive 
sanctions on a country that experiences an epidemic without having reported the 
preceding outbreak.  This is unlikely to be very effective, however, because the country 
will already be suffering ex post sanctions from the rest of the world, and one more will 
make little difference.   A more promising policy direction might instead be to curb 
excessive ex post trade sanctions by other countries, which, as noted, tend to discourage 
reporting by the affected country.   Consideration could be given to strengthening the 
powers of the WHO (probably in cooperation with the WTO) to discourage or prohibit 
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measures approved by the WHO in a given case.   
Laxminarayan and Malani (2006) also analyze the important real world case of 
preemptive sanctions:  countries in the rest of the world (or their citizens) often impose 
sanctions before any formal report from the country, based on their beliefs about the 
probability of an outbreak having occurred.  (Indeed, we can add, a country’s own 
citizens often impose their own preemptive sanctions, through the sorts of private 
preventive actions discussed above.)  Such beliefs are likely to be well correlated with the 
volume of information about possible outbreaks flowing out through informal or non-
official channels.  In contrast to ex post sanctions, the analysis of this case suggests that 
preemptive sanctions are likely to increase disease surveillance and reporting by outbreak 
countries.  Because a country might be sanctioned even if it does not report an outbreak, 
the incremental cost of reporting falls.   
Some interesting policy implications flow from this analysis. For example, policy 
measures that increase the flow of information about countries (for example widespread 
cell phone use, or the new powers of the WHO to collect and use non-official 
information) should also increase the incentives to report. The existence of independent 
health prediction markets (described in footnote 9 above) could also have this effect.  
Under these conditions countries that in fact have a lower than average risk of an 
outbreak will have an incentive to communicate this fact to the rest of the world.  This 
would provide the WHO with another policy instrument, the ability to audit and verify 
the quality and transparency of a country’s surveillance system.  As lower risk countries 
are vetted by the WHO, the rest of the world will tend to increase its estimate of the 
probability of an outbreak in the higher risk un-vetted countries that remain, increasing 
the probability of pre-emptive sanctions on these countries.  This will then increase the 
incentives for the less risk-prone among these remaining countries to also get audited by 
the WHO – and so on, a virtuous snowballing or so-called “reverse lemons” effect. 
  Given that in the modern mass communications universe there is little hope of any 
but the most rigorously isolated country being able to prevent a flow of (possibly 
inaccurate) non-official information about the disease situation, simple openness and 
honesty may be a better approach. Straightforward reporting about what the government 
and public health specialists know or do not know would help squeeze out the space for 
unfounded rumor and would provide the population with tools to protect themselves in 
ways that minimize the chance of panic and excessive costs of prevention.   
Singapore’s pro-active and transparent information strategy during the SARS 
crisis can provide useful pointers here.  The Ministry of Health issued its first SARS 
update on March 13, the day after WHO issued its first global alert on SARS, and 
thereafter issued daily or twice daily updates till the end of May.  These updates provided 
a stream of the best objective information available at the time on the nature of the 
disease, symptoms, transmission mechanism, numbers of infections, fatalities, chances of 
recovery and preventive health care information.  (Singapore Ministry of Health 2003).  
The health ministry updates were part of an extensive information campaign waged using 
websites, telephone hotlines, TV, radio, newspaper ads and posters, with political support 
from the highest level of the government, under the slogan “Fighting SARS Together”.  
(Government of Singapore 2003).   
  21Did it work?  We are not aware of any systematic studies comparing information 
strategies in the SARS infected countries and their potential effects on public risk 
perceptions, on public behavior and on ultimate economic and epidemiological outcomes, 
which would in any case be a complex statistical undertaking, given the many and subtle 
mutual interdependencies at work.  Exhibit 2 above showed that the proportion of people 
in Singapore who thought it very or somewhat likely that they would get infected was 
less than half that in Hong Kong.  However that may only reflect the fact that the attack 
rate of the disease was also much lower in Singapore than in Hong Kong.  More research 
is clearly needed.    
 
5.  Final Remarks 
This paper looks at some lessons about the economic impacts of infectious 
diseases suggested by the SARS epidemic of 2003, the Surat plague outbreak of 1994 and 
other similar events.  The distinctive feature of these episodes is that although they 
ultimately result in relatively little illness and death, they entail large economic costs 
which are primarily the result of excessive preventive behavior by individuals and (on 
occasion) governments.  The paper suggests that recent work in economic epidemiology 
may provide a natural framework for analyzing SARS/Surat type events, where 
preventive costs predominate, diseases like HIV-AIDS, where the costs of illness and 
death predominate, as well as diseases like pandemic influenza, where both types of cost 
could be very high. A particularly valuable feature of this approach is the central 
attention it gives to the behavioral choices made by individuals as a key variable in the 
epidemiology and dynamics of infectious disease.  Such a focus also naturally draws 
attention to the subjective judgments of probability on which individuals base their 
decisions, and to the psychological, informational and social influences that shape such 
judgments. The possibility of economically costly biases and errors in individuals’ 
subjective judgments about disease suggest a potentially important role for public 
information and risk communication strategies.  But account also needs to be taken of the 
incentives for governments to be transparent (or otherwise) in risk communications.  The 
growth of mass communications technologies in non-official hands (cell phones, internet 
etc) appears to increase incentives for official honesty. 
While the paper has pointed to recent work in different areas of economics that 
helps provide a more coherent conceptual framework for analyzing the economic impacts 
of infectious diseases, it also makes apparent the need for much more detailed and 
disease-specific research on the key relationships between disease biology, epidemiology 
and behavioral choice. An important research priority is to gain a better understanding of 
the types and intensity of prevalence elastic responses for different diseases, and of how 
they vary according to the transmission mechanism, virulence and other biological 
characteristics of the disease, the availability of information about the disease, the quality 
of medical and public health resources that are available, the general level of economic 
development, and so on.  We need in particular to better understand how people gather 
information, form their perceptions of risk and make decisions in the high stress 
environment of an infectious disease outbreak.  Public opinion surveys taken during 
SARS provide tantalizing glimpses of public perceptions at these times, but such 
  22information needs to be gathered much more extensively and with more attention to 
survey design.  The WHO could play an important role by formulating and making 
available appropriate standard survey instruments that local universities or public health 
research institutions could use to quickly begin surveys when a disease outbreak occurs 
in some part of the world.  Such information could also help governments design more 
effective information strategies to address the most significant information gaps or 
confusions among the public.  More research is also needed on the feedback from private 
behavioral changes to disease epidemiology.  Just how effective were private behavior 
changes in helping curb SARS, for example?  Could the same effects have been achieved 
by less extreme or different behavior changes?  Information of this kind could help public 
health authorities design better disease surveillance and control strategies which draw 
upon the active participation of the public while reducing inadvertent or excessive side-
effects on the economy.  Collaboration across diverse scientific disciplines such as 
disease biology, epidemiology, economics and psychology is likely to prove especially 
fruitful in this research program.  
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